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interpreted the "purpose" element of
§1985(3) such that "gender-based animus" fulfilled its terms. Id. The circuit
court also referred to New York NO Wv.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). In
New York NOW, a factually similar case,
the second circuit court of appeals held
that blocking access to abortion facilities that served interstate clientele violated the constitutional right to travel.
NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at
585.
In determining whether the district
court acted properly in granting the
injunction, the circuit court noted Prendergastv. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43,
50-51 (1923), as providing the appropriate standard of review. In Prendergast, the Court held that the factors to
be considered in reviewing whether
there was an abuse of discretion are the
entry, duration, and scope of the injunction. The circuit court held there was io
abuse of discretion in NO Wv. Operation
Rescue because the lower court ruling
substantially conformed to the rulings of
other circuit courts on the relevant
questions of law. NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 585. The court of
appeals also found that the scope of the
injunction was reasonable because, although the district court limited the
injunction to Northern Virginia for a
definitive period of time, it was implicit
in the district court opinion that the
relief was granted against particular individuals and particular acts. The circuit
court also affirmed the district court's
decision not to expand the injunction to
encompass activities tending to "intimidate, harass or disturb patients or potential patients" on the grounds that
those activities were protected by the
first amendment. NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 584. Members of
Operation Rescue were free, by verbal
means, to attempt to persuade women
not to seek the services of abortion facilities and to "'impress upon members of
society' the moral rightness and intensity of their opposition to abortion." Id.
at 586 (quoting NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D.
Va. 1989)).
By its ruling, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit established that right-to-life demonstrators
could be enjoined from blocking access

to abortion and abortion related facilities located in the fourth circuit jurisdiction. In addition, NOW v. Operation
Rescue is significant as it holds that a
woman's right to travel cannot be infringed upon by demonstrators' first
amendment rights to freedom of speech.
-Michael Scott Cohen
Illinois v. Rodriguez: WARRANTLESS
ENTRY VALID IF BASED ON THE
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT A
CONSENTING THIRD PARTY
POSSESSED COMMON AUTHORITY OVER THE PREMISES
The Supreme Court recently expanded the scope of third party consent
upon which government authorities may
rely when entering a defendant's home.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez,110 S. Ct. 2793
(1990), the Supreme Court held that a
warrantless entry by police was valid
when based upon the consent of a third
party whom police reasonably believed
possessed common authority over the
premises.
Gail Fischer, who previously lived
with Edward Rodriguez in his apartment, was assaulted by Rodriguez and
summoned police to her mother's home
to report the assault. Facilitating Rodriguez's arrest, Fischer accompanied
police to Rodriguez's apartment and
consented to their entry using a key that
she possessed. The police had neither an
arrest warrant for Rodriguez nor a search
warrant for the apartment. The police
believed that Fischer had authority to
consent based upon several references
to the apartment as "our" apartment and
her statement that she had clothing and
furniture in the apartment. Upon entering Rodriguez's apartment, the police
observed drug paraphernalia and cocaine in plain view and, discovering Rodriguez asleep in his bedroom, they arrested him. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at
2797 (1990).
Rodriguez moved to suppress all evidence seized at the time of the arrest,
claiming that Fischer had vacated the
apartment several weeks earlier and
thus no longer possessed authority to
consent to the entry. The trial court
agreed and granted Rodriguez's motion
to suppress. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme
Court denied the state's Petition for
Leave to Appeal. The United States

Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at
2797.
The Court began its analysis by examining UnitedStates v. Matlock,415 U.S.
164 (1974) and the fourth amendment's
general prohibition against warrantless
entry into a person's home. Rodriguez,
110 S.Ct. at 2797 (citing US. v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164 (1974)). In Matlock,police
officers entered premises without a warrant but with the consent of a third party
who, because of joint access or control
of the premises, possessed common
authority to consent to the entry. Id. at
2797 (1990) (citing U.S. v. Matlock,
415 U.S. at 171 (1974)). The Court
upheld the validity of the police entry,
reasoning that when an individual permits another joint access to or control of
his home, his expectation of privacy is
lowered. However, the Matlock Court
left unresolved the issue of the validity of
a warrantless entry based upon consent
of a third party, whom the police reasonably believe has common authority
to consent. Id. at 2801 (1990) (citing
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177 (1974)).
The Rodriguez Court, addressing the
unresolved issue in Matlock, held that
the reasonableness, and not the correctness, of the police officers' belief in
the third party's authority to consent is
the standard by which fourth amendment rights should be measured. Id. at
2800. The Court found Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) consistent
with its reasoning in Rodriguez. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800 (1990). In
Stoner, the Court held that police improperly entered Stoner's hotel room
because it was unrealistic to believe in
the "apparent authority" of a hotel clerk.
Id. at 2801 (citing Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964)).
In distinguishing Rodriguez from
Stoner,the Court emphasized that it was
unreasonable for police to believe that a
hotel clerk possessed common authority to consent to an entry, whereas
Fischer may have appeared to have such
authority because of her joint control.
Id. at 2801. The Court, therefore, remanded the case for a determination as
to whether the police had sufficient
grounds to support a reasonable belief
that Fischer had authority to consent. Id.
at 2801. If on remand it was determined
that the police officers were reasonable
in believing that Fischer had authority,
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such a finding would be sufficient to
validate the entry. Id. at 2801.
The Court rejected Rodriguez's argument that permitting entry based on the
"reasonable belief' of common authority vicariously waives a defendant's
fourth amendment rights. Id. The Court,
in rejecting this contention, de-emphasized Rodriguez's waiver of his fourth
amendment rights and highlighted the
reasonableness of the officers' belief in
Fischer's authority to consent. Id. at
2800. The Court stated that "at issue in a
claim where apparent consent is raised
is not whether the right to be free of
searches has been waived,but whether
the right to be free of unreasonable
searches has been violated." Id. at 2801
(emphasis original). Noting that the
fourth amendment is the source from
which Rodriguez's trial rights regarding
the exclusionary rule derives, the Court
reasoned that to violate a defendant's
rights against the admission of exclusionary evidence, the fourth amendment
itself must first be violated. Id.In analyzing whether a fourth amendment violation occurred, the Court reasoned that
the fourth amendment itself does not
assure that a government search of a
home will not occur, but assures only
that an "unreasonable" search will not
occur. Id. at 2799.
As the Court stated in Schencklotb v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),
"[n]othing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement
suggests that it ought to be extended to
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures." Rod
riguez, 110 S.Ct. at 2799 (1990) (quoting Schnecklotb v. Bustamonte,412 U.S.
at 241 (1973)). The Rodriguez Court,
therefore, reasoned that the fourth
amendment only guaranteed Rodriguez
protection against "unreasonable"
governmental searches, not freedom
from searches without his consent.
Justice Marshall wrote a lengthy dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens. The dissent contended that a
search pursuant to an officer's reasonable but erroneous belief that a third
party had authority to consent differs
from valid third party authority to consent to governmental entry. Id. at 2802
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent
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reasoned that giving a third party
authority to consent to entry limits an
owner's ability to challenge the reasonableness of a search because allowing another person access to or control
of property reduces an owner's expectation of privacy. Id. at 2802 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissent believed that
where no actual relinquishment of access
or control occurs, and a third party lacks
actual authority to consent, there cannot be an exception to the warrant
requirement because there would remain an expectation of privacy. Id. The
dissent reasoned that subjecting a person to a warrantless search without
authorized consent or exigency would
erode the fourth amendment's protection of a home from "unreasonable"
governmental intrusion. Id. at 2807
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Rodriguez is significant in that it
broadens the third party consent exception to the warrant requirement for
entry into an individual's home. The
practical effect of the decision is that if a
third party convinces law enforcement
officials of his apparent authority to consent to entry, no warrant for entry will
be required and thus, the homeowner's
expectation of privacy will be diminished. In addition, Rodriguez illustrates
the present Court's reluctance to restrict governmental action in drug related
cases.
-

DarylD. Jones

In re Moore: DEBTORS' INTERESTS
IN ERISA-QUALIFIED PROFITSHARING AND PENSION PLAN
BEYOND THE REACH OF
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE.
The United States Court ofAppeals for
the Fourth Circuit in In re Moore, 907
F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990) reconciled
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
with those of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§1001 et seq. (1976) (ERISA). The
court found that debtors' interests in an
ERISA-qualified profit-sharing and pension plan were not subject to turnover
to the trustee in bankrutpcy, because
ERISA constitutes applicable non-bankruptcy law.
A number of employees of Springs
Industries who participated in their
company's comprehensive retirement
program became involved in Chapter 7

bankruptcy proceedings. The program's
Profit-Sharing and Pension Plan and
Trust and Retirement Plan and Trust
contained anti-assignment provisions
which prohibited the employees from
alienating their interests. The antiassignment provisions were necessary
to qualify the employees' interests in the
plans as ERISA funds and maintain their
tax-exempt status. Under the plans, distributions were to be made to beneficiaries "only upon retirement, disability
or termination of service." Moore, 907
F.2d at 1477. The debtors had received
no distributions from the plans at the
time they petitioned for bankruptcy and
were not eligible to do so in the near
future.
The trustee in bankruptcy sought to
compel the Profit-Sharing and Pension
Plan and Trust administrator to turn
over the employees' interests to the
bankruptcy estates. The trustee argued
that the interests in the plan were not
subject to restrictions on transfer, because the plan was not a spendthrift
trust under South Carolina law. Without
addressing whether the plan was a spendthrift trust under South Carolina law, the
bankruptcy court determined that since
the plan was ERISA-qualified, the debtors' interests in the plan were nonalienable and thus excludable from the
bnkruptcyestates Thetusteeinbankutcy
appealed the decision. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit noted that under the
Bankruptcy Code, the property of a
bankrupt's estate consists of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of
the case." Moore, 907 F.2d at 1477 (citing 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(1)). However,
the Code excludes the debtors' interests
in certain trusts from their bankruptcy
estates by recognizing restrictions on
transfers of such interests. Specifically,
"[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that
is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.
§541 (c)(2)). Thus, if ERISA constitutes
applicable nonbankruptcy law, and the
debtors' interests are enforceable under
ERISA, the trustee would be precluded
from reaching those interests.
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under

